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 The United Kingdom (UK) provides an important case study when analysing the influence of 
 religious attitudes and values on political behaviour in the European Union. Our research 
 shows British Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to be relatively at ease working 
 with the different faith-based organisations which seek to influence the European policy 
 process - and much more so than many of their colleagues from other member states. This can 
 potentially be explained by the more ‘pluralist’ political culture which is prevalent in the UK, 
 and can also be related to the comparatively high rates of non-church attendance amongst the 
 British sample which facilitates their even-handedness towards different groups. This, in turn, 
 produces a resistance to allowing religious factors to disproportionately influence European 
 policymaking.      
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Introduction 
 
The European Parliament (EP) is the arena of the European Union (EU) which focuses most 
on issues related to human rights, political culture and national identity. While other parts of 
the European Quarter of Brussels are preoccupied with trade agreements, tariffs and 
agricultural quotas, those who operate within the Espace Léopold, as well as in the main 
plenary hemisphere in Strasbourg, have always sought to interpret their remit in a way that 
represents the concerns of ordinary European citizens and wider European civil society. The 
EU promotes a narrative of cohesion, convergence and unity which explicitly encompasses 
democratic beliefs and values; meanwhile, the EP seeks to democratically represent the 
interests of all sections of society, including both religious and non-religious citizens (EP 
n.d.).  
 In many ways, the EU has repeatedly displayed a determination to remain formally 
secular, mimicking a classic French-style laïcité in both its treaties and directives (see Foret 
and Riva 2010). Yet this frequently made comparison arguably presents only a partial picture 
- in fact, the way different religious interest groups in Brussels are forced to compete on an 
even ‘playing field’ also has distinct overtones of the American version of church and state 
separation. It was the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 which first truly articulated the 
importance of protecting fundamental rights and promoting non-discrimination in relation to 
religion (EU n.d.). Some commentators question the success of the EU in finding the right 
balance between promoting religious freedoms and protecting freedom from religion (see 
Foret and Itçaina 2011). Indeed the logic of the EU’s now longstanding policy of ‘privatising’ 
religion has become even more strained since the European Commission (EC) and the 
European Parliament (EP) started to legislate increasingly in areas of social policy and human 
rights, complementing their traditional interest in trade and economic affairs.  
 So while religion may help to define Europe, it plays a much more ambiguous role in 
the EU. Despite the fact that Christianity has its institutional home in Europe, contributing 
substantially in the process to what constitutes the core of European identity, the role of 
churches and faith-based organisations in European integration and wider multi-level 
governance appears to be highly complex. Pinning down the precise influence of religion on 
the government and politics of Europe seems challenging. Nevertheless the United Kingdom 
(UK) provides an important case study when analysing the influence of the religious attitudes 
on political behaviour and public policy. While the UK may not formally separate church and 
state - with Anglican bishops even sitting and voting in the upper house of Parliament - the 
wider policy environment unquestionably embraces the democratic spirit of equality of 
opportunity, applied regardless of race, religion, gender or sexuality. Members of Parliament 
(MPs) operate under strict codes of conduct, which cover even the way they meet 
constituents: for example, it is against the rules for MPs to try to help a voter who does not 
live in their constituency (HC 2012). Detailed regulations also cover the way individual 
donations are made to party organisations and election campaigns (El C n.d.). The entire 
political system – while far from perfect – is nevertheless designed to aid access and 
transparency in relation to the business of government.  
 Since the socio-economic reforms initiated by Margaret Thatcher’s governments from 
1979 onwards, Britain has developed a ‘pluralist’ political culture comparable with those of 
other parts of the ‘Anglosphere’ like the United States (US), where elected representatives are 
comfortable consulting with interest groups on an equal and open basis (Dahl 1961). This can 
be contrasted with the more ‘corporatist’ system that has traditionally operated across much 
of Western Europe, including large economies such as Germany, where governments 
establish formal social partnerships with a select few business organisations and trade unions 
which then play a central role in public policymaking (Heeg 2012). Meanwhile 
accompanying ‘ever closer union’ in Europe a sophisticated system of interest group politics 
now fully operational in Brussels has developed. This system can be likened to the longer 
established equivalent in Washington DC: public affairs functioning as a profession, replacing 
the politics of class, region or religion (Mahoney 2008). 
 Given what has been implied about aspects of the lobbying environment operating in 
the European Quarter of Brussels, we should expect Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) from the UK to be relatively at ease working with the different religious and 
nonreligious representations seeking to influence different parts of the European policy 
process. Our research shows that this is indeed the case, and more so than it is with many of 
their counterparts from other member-states. We can also attempt to relate this to the 
comparatively high rates of agnosticism and atheism amongst the British sample, and also to 
the way that they believe public policy should be formulated – for example, in reference to 
foreign policy and the accession of Turkey as a EU member state. 
 
The survey questionnaire and the British MEP sample  
 
The main instrument used for collecting data about the religious preferences of the British 
MEPs was a survey questionnaire, controlled centrally by the Institute for European Studies 
at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB). This allows wider comparisons to be made with 
the other member-states included in the 'Religion at the European Parliament' (RelEP) project 
(http://www.releur.eu/): Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain. The 
survey was divided up into a number of different sections based around a range of themes 
connected to religious issues and European government affairs, including the individual work 
of MEPs, the wider work of the EP and ultimately the activities of the EU as a whole. 
Christianity plays a historically important part in the civic life of European nations, so how 
do MEPs approach the influence and power of the Church? How sensitive is the EP to 
religious issues and matters of faith? Religion – via Christianity - can be said to be core to 
European identity, uniting different nationalities when language can sometimes divide them. 
Yet how does the EU approach religion, especially its most democratic and representative 
arm, the EP?  
 We start by examining the profiles of the British MEPs. Sixteen out of a total 73 
(22%) responded to the survey questionnaire. This type of response rate is typical of an elite 
survey of this nature, but still large enough to allow us to draw wider conclusions about what 
British MEPs think about religious issues, especially when there is unanimity or near 
unanimity of responses, as there frequently is with many of the questions involved. Taken as 
a whole with the responses from other member states (which also generated a similar 
response rate – 167 out of 736 MEPs, or 23%), we are certainly able to track certain patterns 
of attitudes and behaviour. Fortunately, the 16 respondents from the UK represent a range of 
different party groupings, terms served and committee specialisation. 
 Five Liberal Democrats, four Conservatives, three Labour members, three UK 
Independence Party members, and one Scottish Nationalist participated in the survey. This 
meant that the largest parliamentary group represented was the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The obvious point to make in addition to the above is the 
total absence of MEPs from the European People’s Party (EPP) in the UK section of the 
survey sample. Perhaps the most visible formal link of all between religion and politics in the 
EU can be found in the chamber of the EP via the work of the EPP, the political movement 
that brings together MEPs who are Christian Democrats, and which, prior to the 2014 
elections, constituted the largest elected group with 270 members. The EPP seeks to promote 
values and policies which have a religious origin, albeit not as centrally as it once did 
(Duncan 2013). Yet in Britain, the centre-right party, the Conservative Party, has no 
ideological links at all with Christian Democracy, and their MEPs even sit in an entirely 
different party group in the EP chamber, that of the European Conservatives and Reformists 
(ECR). This move came about as a result of increasing Euroscepticism in the party, and a 
growing unease at being part of the group that formally describes itself as ‘Europe’s Driving 
Force’ (EPP n.d.).  
 We can also link this absence of Christian Democracy in Britain with the more 
pluralist interest group culture already mentioned. After all, the corporatist consensus across 
much of Western Europe in countries such as Germany, The Netherlands and Austria is 
ultimately a Christian Democratic one with its origins in the implementation of various 
components of the European Social Model (ESM) – a middle-way in policymaking which 
argues that economic growth should not come at the expense of social cohesion. In 
comparison, the UK adheres to a much more Anglo-American political economy model 
which restricts state interference in the free market and, as a consequence, promotes a more 
fluid and open system of organised interests (including, as in our case, faith-based ones). 
 Nine out of 16 members (56%) were elected in the 1999-2004 term with the next 
biggest intake (four or 25%) coming in 2004-2009. Only one (6%) was elected for the first 
time only in 2009, while two (13%) were first elected back in 1994. Two of the respondents 
have since resigned as MEPs, while one has changed political party. A range of parliamentary 
committees are represented by the respondents – in total, 13 out of 23 – with two vice-chairs 
included in the sample. As we can see from Table 1 below, this means that the British sample 
included a relatively experienced group of parliamentarians compared with the EU-wide 
sample involving all the member states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Number of terms served at the European Parliament. 
 
Number of terms Percentage of sample  
(UK only) 
Percentage of sample  
(EU) 
 
1 
 
6 47 
2 
 
25 30 
3 
 
56 14 
4 
 
13 5 
5 
 
0 2 
6 
 
0 1 
7 
 
0 1 
 
 
 These data collectively allow us to draw some conclusions about the wider religious 
views of British MEPs. It is unlikely that their basic responses to the questions would be 
dramatically different on the majority of issues, as there is often agreement amongst the 
respondents. Clearly, a larger response rate would have produced more detail and 
explanations, but for our purposes we can still evaluate the underlying values and attitudes on 
display and make a valid contribution to the literature on politics and religion, EU politics, 
interest groups and electoral and partisan politics. While previous research has focused on the 
way faith-based groups lobby the EC in Brussels (Leustean 2012), the survey questionnaire 
also allows us to quantify and measure political influence. The policy analysis approach 
mentioned before is understandable: the role of interest groups in EU government is arguably 
more prominent than the role of parties and elections. Even since the EP has been handed 
more powers, the EC has remained the EU’s central political institution and ‘engine of 
integration’. As scholars have attempted to untangle the place of religion in the EU, they have 
looked first to the role of the Conference of European Churches (CEC), for example, as well 
to treaties and constitutional reforms (Leustean and Madeley 2009). Yet the arena of the EP 
ought not to be ignored, especially given its overtly representative democratic remit. In an era 
when the democratic deficit of Europe is frequently highlighted (Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig 2013), and with the Eurozone crisis raising many questions about the 
legitimacy of the political structure of the EU, such questions are especially timely. 
 
An open door policy: the influence of religious interest groups 
 
Are religious interests represented effectively by British MEPs? Freedom of religion is one of 
the core principles actively promoted by the EU in its neighbourhood policy (ENP), and 
embraced especially enthusiastically by democratically elected MEPs – yet is freedom of 
religion protected within the borders of the EU by those same elected party politicians? One 
of the most damaging criticisms levelled at the EU is that it has failed to create a functioning 
public sphere with a European civic society (Dür and Mateo 2012). Interest groups may well 
lobby at a European level but rarely exclusively: rather, they maintain one eye on their own 
national policy environments. While churches can hardly be said to ‘democratise’ the EU, 
their capacity for creating healthy social capital and community engagement is often the envy 
of many political parties and politicians (Putnam 2000). Linked to that, their ability to 
stimulate public debate and mobilise public opinion about moral and ethical questions is also 
considerable. So how do our politicians respond? 
 Taken together, Tables 2, 3 and 4 reveal an important trend in the responses of British 
MEPs. First, in Table 1, we see that they are probably more comfortable using the 
terminology of ‘political realities’ than the language of ‘personal inspiration’ when it comes 
to discussing the impact of religion upon their work activities. These responses are interesting 
as they show the British politicians acknowledging religion primarily when they are forced to 
engage with it as part of a professional relationship – 32% (6) as a social and political reality 
combined with 21% (4) as an interest group. However, 21% (4) of British MEPs are willing 
to openly admit that they mix religion and politics as a consequence of their own personal 
belief system – slightly less than the European average (31%). This also reinforces the 
argument that British MEPs – who are broadly in line with other European MEPs here – are 
quite happy to engage with different religious and non-religious groups, on the understanding 
that they have a legitimate right to representation and to participate fully in the political 
process. 
 
Table 2. Religion and MEP activities. 
 
 
Type of intervention 
(several responses 
possible, ranked 1-3) 
Percentage of 
sample  
(UK only) 
Percentage of 
sample  
(EU) 
 
as a source of 
personal 
inspiration 
 
21 31 
as a social 
and political 
reality 
 
32 38 
as an 
interest group 
 
 
21 19 
other 
 
 
 
16 7 
no effect 
 
 
 
11 4 
 
 A related survey question, meanwhile, asked the MEPs to consider the differences in 
behaviour within the context of multilevel governance (Table 3). Is the place of religion in the 
EP comparable with their experiences in national politics and government? We can note the 
difference between the responses of the British MEPs and the EU-wide average: 38% (6) of 
UK respondents state there is no difference, compared with 19% (3) who say that there is a 
difference. Even taking into account the relatively high ‘did not answer’ rate here, this can be 
still considered a departure from the way their other European colleagues have answered. 
53% state there is a difference between the national and EU contexts. While we cannot say 
for sure what has caused that, we can speculate that it is linked to British MEPs feeling more 
comfortable in the policy and lobbying environment of Brussels. 
 
Table 3. Experiences in national politics. 
 
Different from 
national politics? 
 
Percentage of 
sample  
(UK only) 
Percentage of 
sample (EU) 
 
yes 19 53 
no 38 33 
did not answer 43 14 
 
 
 Table 4 focuses specifically on that lobbying environment: the survey asked how 
often  the MEPs were in contact with religious or philosophical interest groups. While the 
responses from the British MEPs are broadly in line with those of the European average, with 
both showing healthy levels of contact with religious and philosophical groups, a closer 
inspection does suggest that the UK MEPs are in contact slightly more with such 
organisations. 19% (3) state that they are in contact once a week or more, for example, 
compared with only 4% of the European sample. 38% (6) state that they are in contact a few 
times over the course of a parliamentary term, compared with only 22% of MEPs on average. 
Also, only 13% of respondents state that they have never been lobbied by such groups. We 
can therefore say that most of the British MEPs have been lobbied by religious or faith-based 
organisations at some point.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Contact with religious or philosophical interest groups. 
 
Frequency of contact 
 
Percentage of  
sample (UK only) 
Percentage of 
sample (EU) 
 
 
once a week or more 
 
 
19 4 
once a month or more 
 
 
6 12 
a few times a year 
 
 
13 30 
a few times over the 
course of a term 
 
38 22 
never 
 
 
13 14 
did not answer 
 
12 17 
 
 
 While the individual tables so far do not necessarily reveal a hugely marked 
difference between the UK and EU respondents, they do potentially imply that the UK MEPs 
are generally comfortable working within this type of pluralist policy environment 
functioning within the EP. Additional qualitative comments from the survey and interviews 
also reveal that British MEPs appear to approach this from a member-state perspective: that 
is, if they have a constituent who is active in a group then this will potentially help with 
gaining access: this appears to be the key rationale that lies behind meetings being set up, 
according to the MEPs.  
 Overall then, we see that while British MEPs are consulted regularly by faith-based 
organisations and churches, and often from their local constituencies, they are also clearly 
able to function independently. Religious representatives are certainly listened to respectfully, 
but beyond that there is no admission from MEPs that they are given undue access of 
influence. Religious and faith-based groups are not given special privileges or access to the 
corridors of power in Brussels or Strasbourg beyond what one might reasonably expect, but 
they are given their rightful place as part of a wider network of lobbies, interest groups and 
organisations.  
 
‘We don’t do God’: belonging but not believing? 
 
On the occasion of his 50th birthday in May 2003, the then British prime minister Tony Blair 
gave a suitably glamorous interview to the American magazine Vanity Fair. The wide-
ranging topics which were discussed included both the political and the personal, but when 
the interviewer David Margolick asked Mr Blair about his Christianity, the prime minister’s 
powerful director of strategy and communications Alastair Campbell stepped in immediately: 
‘Is he on God? We don’t do God. I’m sorry. We don’t do God’ (Brown 2003). Clearly, many 
elected British politicians do indeed ‘do God’ – the existence of influential internal party 
groupings such as the Conservative Christian Fellowship (CCF) and the Christian Socialist 
Movement (CSM) are testimony to that. Nevertheless, Mr Campbell’s comments do neatly 
sum up the culture which is probably most prevalent among the British whereby generally 
politicians try to keep their religious views to themselves out of a fear of being perceived to 
be slightly odd. This has little to do with church attendance levels but instead is part of a 
government system where neither American-style personality politics nor Western European 
Christian Democracy have much resonance. Or as Pulzer would have it (1967, 98): ‘class is 
the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail’.    
 The findings of the survey are very unambiguous at this point: compared with the 
European-wide sample as a whole, British MEPs are not particularly religious at all. We see 
the beginnings of this diverging pattern in Table 5 below, with a slightly higher percentage of 
non- or low church attendance compared with the European sample. However it should also 
be stated that the British respondents were broadly in line with the wider European sample in 
the sense that very few of them seemed prepared to answer what they must consider to be an 
essentially personal question. 
 
Table 5. Church attendance. 
 
How often do you attend 
church? 
 
Percentage of the 
sample  
(UK only) 
Percentage of the  
sample  
(EU) 
 
 
never 
 
6 3 
once a year 
 
0 1 
holydays only 
 
19 10 
once a month 
 
0 16 
once a week 
 
13 18 
more than once a week 6 2 
did not answer 56 49 
  
 Table 6, on the other hand, does begin to add much more detail to the figures. Here we 
can see that only 19% (3) state that they are religious people while 25% (4) say that they are 
not believers and another 25% (4) state that they are ‘convinced atheists’. We can discern a 
real divergence between the number of European respondents who define themselves being 
religious and the number of British respondents: 47% of the EU aggregate total state that they 
are religious. We can also conversely note the reverse picture when we look at the number of 
non-religious and convinced atheists: only 15% and 14% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Religious identity. 
 
How would you define 
yourself? 
 
Percentage of the 
sample (UK only) 
Percentage of the 
sample  
(EU) 
 
 
I am a religious person 
 
19 47 
I am not a religious 
person 
 
25 15 
I am convinced atheist 
 
25 14 
did not answer 
 
31 25 
 
 
 Meanwhile Table 7 also highlights disparities between the British respondents and the 
European sample taken as a whole. Many more British MEPs say they do not believe in God 
than their European MEP colleagues (44% (7) compared with 15%) and conversely fewer say 
that they do believe in the existence of a personal God (25% (4) compared with 32%) or 
some sort of spirit or life force (6% - just one MEP - compared with 18% of all European 
respondents). 
 
Table 7. Personal beliefs. 
 
What do you believe? 
 
Percentage of the 
sample (UK only) 
Percentage of the 
sample  
(EU) 
 
 
there is a personal God 
 
25 32 
there is some sort of 
spirit or life force 
 
6 18 
I don’t believe there is 
any God, spirit or life 
force 
 
44 15 
did not answer 
 
25 36 
 
 
 The ‘pluralist’ culture referred to earlier has no direct connection with low church 
attendances in the UK – after all, the United States has high attendance rates in comparison 
and is the home of pluralist politics (see Hertzke 2009). However, what we can perhaps 
suggest is that the UK’s ‘secularism’ reinforces the pluralist policy arena which we have 
identified. Clearly, low levels of religiosity do not produce pluralism but they do possibly 
strengthen aspects of it, making it easier for policymakers to be even–handed in their dealings 
with different groups. After all, whenever aspects of America’s separation of church and state 
do come under threat in relation to the constitution – for example, the provision of school 
prayer - the source tends to be faith-based organisations (FBOs) (see Wilcox and Robinson 
2010). Furthermore, in general, these responses reflect patterns of religious behaviour and 
social attitudes in wider British society. When the MEPs were asked in a separate question 
whether they belonged to a religious denomination, 40% (6) stated that they did, against 44% 
(7) who stated that did not. As we shall see in the next section, while people are often happy 
to identify broadly as Christians, their attendance at church and institutional or practical 
attachment to religion is much less consistent. We now turn to look at this in more detail, in 
order to provide background and context for the patterns of responses which we are detecting 
amongst the MEPs. 
 
Representing the people: the national context  
 
In our analysis so far, we have identified two key ways in which UK MEPs differ from the 
average EU MEP. First, they seem more willing and open to dealing with all types of 
religious interest group and are not challenged by that prospect, perhaps as a result of being 
used to a similar culture in London as well as local British politics. Second, they are 
themselves more atheistic and non-religious with especially low levels of church attendance. 
In fact Britain has long provided scholars interested in the interface between politics and 
religion with a distinctive case (see Steven 2010). Uniquely amongst advanced industrial 
western democracies, the UK has an unwritten constitution with no bill of rights, senior 
clergy sitting in the upper house of Parliament in London, and as has already been noted in 
the introduction, no confessional parties such as the Christian Democrats.  
 The decline in British church attendance since the 1960s is well documented;  
however, in general it is a somewhat complicated and multi-layered picture. The eminent 
British sociologist of religion Grace Davie has charted a growing trend of ‘believing without 
belonging’ (1994): in other words, people still feel some of spiritual force but no longer feel 
the need to comply with the social convention of attending their local church on a Sunday 
morning. There is also a third dimension which is perhaps of most interest to political 
scientists: whether or not people self-identify as ‘Christian’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘Jewish’. Here 
again, when looking at the British context, there is evidence of decline in strength of religious 
identification, but equally, as we shall now discuss, the figures are not totally conclusive.     
 In the most recent government census (2011), 33.2 million people (59.3%) in England 
and Wales still described themselves as ‘Christian’ (ONS 2011). The previous census in 2001 
was the first time that the question ‘what is your religion?’ had been asked in Great Britain 
(excluding Northern Ireland): then 71.7% had answered ‘Christian’. There is an estimated 
Muslim population of around 4.8%. Clearly this shows a drop in the number of people 
identifying as Christian but it also reveals nearly 60% of respondents still identifying as such. 
Meanwhile, as Figure 1 below shows, there is still a large (albeit falling) number of people 
who do go to their local parish church on a Sunday morning. Indeed in many urban areas - 
especially ethnically diverse parts of London - Protestant Evangelical churches are even 
growing in popularity (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2009, 136; Brierley Consultancy 2013). 
Linked to this is the fact that while there has been a decline since the 1960s in the number of 
Britons who believe in God, a substantial number also still do so.  
 
 
Figure 1. Belief in God and usual Sunday church attendance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Archbishops’ Council, 2006: Gallup / ORB / ICM  
 *See Barley (2006) 
 
 Finally it is worth noting that the Church of England remains the established state 
church with the queen as its head. 26 of its senior prelates sit and vote in the British 
Parliament at Westminster in London. Even in the government’s latest plans to reform the 
upper chamber, the House of Lords, to make it more democratic, the draft bill guarantees the 
continued presence of the bishops or ‘lords spiritual’ (CO 2012). So politicians, including 
MEPs, are respectful of the place of Christianity in the development of British democracy 
without necessarily feeling any compulsion to be under its control. We can also make 
comparisons with the behaviour of national Members of Parliament (MPs). Tables 8 and 9 
below show the responses of MPs who participated in the PARTIREP survey 
(http://www.partirep.eu/datafile/comparative-mp-survey) organised by a team of Belgian political 
scientists (2007-2011). In Table 8, we see that large numbers of British MPs regard 
promoting the views of religious interest groups as being important. For example, 22.2% 
regard it as being very important, the most popular response and not one replicated by any of 
the other member states apart from Germany.  
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Table 8. Importance of promoting the views and interests of a church or religious group by 
country (national and regional MPs). 
 
Degree of 
importance 
Country (%) Total 
(Av.) 
(%) 
AUT BEL FRA GER HUN IRE ISR ITA NET NOR POL POR SPA SWI UNK 
1 (no imp) 15,4 25,0 31,4 3,8 9,3 8,7 5,7 7,2 20,8 19,4 12,2 8,1 14,8 22,7 11,1 13,6 
2 10,6 21,9 19,6 10,0 9,3 17,4 8,6 12,0 9,4 22,2 12,2 15,1 12,7 23,7 7,4 13,4 
3 16,0 18,8 15,7 10,5 13,4 17,4 14,3 18,1 9,4 16,7 19,5 14,0 10,5 12,4 16,0 13,9 
4 23,9 16,4 21,6 15,5 14,4 17,4 20,0 25,3 22,6 19,4 39,0 24,4 15,3 14,4 19,8 19,2 
5 10,6 6,2 3,9 20,9 21,6 8,7 25,7 15,7 18,9 13,9 12,2 18,6 12,2 13,4 16,0 14,7 
6 13,8 7,8 3,9 17,2 14,4 21,7 5,7 8,4 9,4 5,6 2,4 4,7 14,0 10,3 7,4 11,4 
7 (very imp) 9,6 3,9 3,9 22,2 17,5 8,7 20,0 13,3 9,4 2,8 2,4 15,1 20,5 3,1 22,2 13,8 
TOTAL (N) 188 128 51 239 97 23 35 83 53 36 41 86 229 97 81 1467 
 
 
 Last, we see in Table 9 that British MPs were out in front in terms of the number of 
times they met with religious groups. For example, 12.1% of them met with representatives 
of religious groups once a week, significantly more frequently than MEPs from any of the 
other member states apart from Hungary, with only 2.2% stating that they had (almost) no 
contact, a response which was easily the lowest amongst all EU member states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Frequency of contact with churches or religious organisations by country (national 
and regional Mps). 
 
Frequency Country (%) Total 
(Av.) 
(%) 
AUT BEL FRA GER HUN IRE ISR ITA NET NOR POL POR SPA SWI UNK 
at least once a 
week 4,1 1,5 0,0 6,4 15,5 0,0 6,2 5,2 1,9 2,7 8,5 1,0 2,2 2,0 12,1 4,7 
at least once a 
month 16,4 6,1 4,8 33,9 24,7 10,3 25,0 9,3 7,4 10,8 17,0 9,4 6,6 6,9 30,8 15,9 
at least every 
three months 27,7 17,6 17,5 32,7 20,6 17,2 18,8 23,7 25,9 18,9 10,6 21,9 15,8 17,6 39,6 23,3 
at least once a 
year 29,7 26,0 42,9 21,9 23,7 48,3 6,2 43,3 33,3 35,1 36,2 27,1 23,7 29,4 15,4 27,5 
(almost) no 
contact 22,1 48,9 34,9 5,2 15,5 24,1 43,3 18,6 31,5 32,4 27,7 40,6 51,8 44,1 2,2 28,5 
TOTAL (N) 195 131 63 251 97 29 32 97 54 37 47 96 228 102 91 1550 
  
 The sample of British MEPs appears to be very similar to the equivalent one for 
British MPs in their attitudes towards the way religious groups ought to be accommodated. In 
turn, these attitudes are representative of the wider British population: fewer people may 
attend church than in previous years, but there remains evidence of widespread religiosity as 
well as respect for aspects of religion being prominent in public life. In the 2010 British 
Social Attitudes Survey, 50% of respondents stated that ‘all religious groups should have 
equal rights’ compared with only 24% who disagreed with that sentiment. As the survey 
authors put it, ‘religion has personal and social benefits, but faith should not be taken too far’ 
(Voas and Ling 2010).       
 
‘Render unto Caesar…’: directives and policies 
 
So far, we have argued that British MEPs are more at ease than many of their European 
colleagues with the concept of regularly meeting with religious interest groups as a result of 
the pluralist political culture prevalent in the UK. We have also seen how that is reinforced by 
trends in wider British society which is relatively secularised in many respects. This final 
section focuses as a case study on aspects of the work of the wider EU to emphasise the 
distinctive way in which British MEPs approach these types of affairs. Once again we see 
similar secularist patterns emerging: more specifically, we note that the MEPs are not 
comfortable at all with the idea that Europe’s Christian heritage should be highlighted in the 
Lisbon Treaty,  nor do they have any desire for the EU to have a ‘real policy’ towards 
religions.   
 As Table 10 below indicates, there appears to be no real appetite on the part of British 
MEPs for the EP, the EC or any of the other European actors in Brussels to develop a strategy 
for engaging more with religions such as Christianity or Islam either institutionally or 
collectively. 63% (10) state that they do not think the EU should have a ‘real policy’ towards 
religion, compared with only 31% (5) who do. In fact, this is actually in line with the 
aggregate European figures showing 72% in agreement that the EU should not try to develop 
such a policy.  
 
Table 10. EU policy towards religions. 
 
Should the EU 
have a real policy 
towards religions? 
Percentage of 
the sample  
(UK only) 
Percentage of the  
sample  
(EU) 
 
 
yes 31 28 
no 63 72 
did not answer 6 0 
 
 
 Thus far, the views of the British MEPs are consistent with those of their European 
colleagues: there should be a separation between church and state when it comes to public 
policy formulation. But a more pronounced contrast comes when we look at the idea of 
enshrining the status of Europe’s Christian heritage in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, the de facto 
constitution of the EU. While 41% of Europe’s MEPs state that this would have been 
desirable, only 19% (3) of British MEPs feel the same way. Moreover 75% (12) say they do 
not think this would have been a good idea compared with 48% of the European average. The 
views expressed by Pope Benedict XVI and also Chancellor Angela Merkel that Europe’s 
religious heritage should be acknowledged (Traynor 2007) would not find much popularity 
within the UK context where the whole concept of the ‘roots’ of Europe are probably much 
less central. The contrast here with the rest of Europe is very pronounced indeed.     
 
Table 11. Lisbon Treaty and Europe’s Christian heritage. 
  
Should the Lisbon 
Treaty have made 
reference to 
Europe’s Christian 
heritage? 
 
Percentage of the 
sample  
(UK only) 
Percentage of the 
sample  
(EU) 
 
yes 19 41 
 
no 75 48 
 
did not answer 6 10 
 
 
 
 Finally, Table 12 below focuses on a key dimension: MEPs were asked whether they 
felt religion had a role to play in the way Turkey’s candidature for accession to the EU was 
received. 75% (12) replied that ‘yes’, religion was relevant – and this is back in line with the 
wider European average of 69%. While we do not know if the MEPs feel that this is a good 
or a bad thing, it is a striking finding nonetheless. European integration is indeed a Christian 
project in this respect. Yet this is not the formal explanation for why Turkey has not yet 
acceded to the EU. According to various actors, geography rather than religion is the most 
salient factor; but this seems a somewhat partial interpretation (European Commission 2013) 
and one that many MEPs do not support. Indeed Britain has long been an outlier in relation to 
Turkish accession with governments of different political persuasions, Conservative and 
Labour, continuously being Turkey’s biggest cheerleader when it comes to EU membership 
(BBC 2013).  
 
Table 12. Religion and Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
 
Does religion play a role in 
the way Turkey’s 
candidature was received 
in the EP?  
 
Percentage of the 
sample (UK only) 
Percentage of the 
sample  
(EU) 
 
yes 75 69 
no 6 20 
did not answer 19 11 
 
 Finally, we see the MEPs putting their values into action: the average MEP does not 
think the EU should seek to develop a formal policy in relation to religion or religions in 
Europe. Yet despite this, the perception amongst all MEPs – regardless of nationality - is that 
aspects of European enlargement policy are heavily influenced by religious factors, contrary 
to the official EU position. Moreover, perhaps unsurprisingly, the British MEPs are prepared 
to take this neutral stance a step further than most of their European colleagues and express 
their satisfaction that no mention was made in the Lisbon Treaty of Europe’s Christian 
heritage. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Analysing the survey responses of MEPs collectively, especially those from the UK, provides 
us with some interesting patterns of political behaviour. First we can state that religious 
organisations are able to successfully exert influence on the EP and that religion therefore still 
very much has some sort of institutional political power. Equally, however, there are no 
hidden agendas: MEPs are understandably not prepared to admit to being under the control of 
religious organisations or faith-based groups. Second we can note a substantial departure 
from the European average with regard to the British MEPs’ personal beliefs: while a clear 
majority of MEPs state that they do believe in God, British MEPs are considerably more 
agnostic. Indeed, they appear to be even more atheistic than the wider population in the UK, 
although there is still evidence that they identify with a religious denomination. Nevertheless 
the UK is now one of Europe’s least religious member-states (EC 2010), so these findings are 
not unreasonable placed against that backdrop - and arguably reinforce pluralistic behaviour 
in the process. Third we can conclude that the EU is perhaps at its most religious when it is 
looking beyond its boundaries – for example, in relation to enlargement policy. The MEPs – 
both British and from other member states -  are clear that the reason for the delay in allowing 
Turkey to join the EU is heavily linked to religious factors despite what the EC would 
officially contend. Meanwhile the British MEPs go further, arguing that that it was correct 
that the Lisbon Treaty made no reference to Europe’s Christian heritage.     
 ‘Multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2000) can be said to summarise the British MEPs’ 
approach to the politics of religion - a Europe for all with different groups, religious and non- 
religious, coexisting alongside each other. The scholarly literature from social scientists has 
shifted quite significantly since the orthodoxy of the 1960s which proclaimed that religion 
was no longer of interest – and in many ways it is Eisenstadt’s theory which has gradually 
come to personify that gear-change, arguing that in modern advanced industrial democracies 
like the UK, different sets of values need not be mutually exclusive. Eisenstadt (2000, 1) 
criticises scholars who ‘assumed, even only implicitly, that the cultural program of modernity 
as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there 
would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies’. So according to the 
survey responses of the British MEPs, the EU should neither deny its Christian roots nor 
trumpet them as central to its existence. The status of religious lobbies within the EU can be 
said to be broadly respected, but no more and no less than that of other groups, organisations 
or interests. Freedom of religion is protected and supported certainly, but not if it impacts 
upon the freedoms of other European citizens.   
  There is evidence throughout the survey responses and interviews of the European 
politicians showing considerable sensitivity to the views and values of their constituents. 
British MEPs appear very adept at seeking to place themselves in the mainstream of public 
opinion, which itself reflects generational shifts in societal behaviour. Church populations in 
the UK are falling – they remain significant but they do not have the institutional power that 
they once had - and it remains to be seen whether they will again in the future. Our MEPs 
tread a moderate line, respecting religion while not necessarily practising religion themselves. 
Europe is the historic home of Christianity but it now leads the world in levels of atheism and 
is the only continent where church attendances are not rising (Norris and Inglehart 2004). 
MEPs from the UK appear highly professional at attempting to reconcile these two 
competing spheres through a pluralistic process of political consultations and compromises.   
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